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A Model of Trade with Ricardian Comparative 





In this paper, we merge the heterogenous firm trade model of Melitz (2003) with the 
Ricardian model of Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson (DFS 1977) to explain how the pattern 
of international  specialization and trade is determined by the interaction of comparative 
advantage, economies of scale, country sizes and trade barriers. The model is able to capture 
the existence of inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade in a single unified framework. It 
explains how trade openness affects the pattern of international specialization and trade. It 
generalizes Melitz’s firm selection effect in the face of trade liberalization to a setting where 
the patterns of inter-industry trade and intra-industry are endogenous. Although opening to 
trade is unambiguously welfare-improving in both countries, trade liberalization can lead to 
an counter-Melitz effect in the larger country if it is insufficiently competitive in the sectors 
where it has the strongest comparative disadvantage but still produces. In  this case, the 
operating productivity cutoff is lowered while the exporting cutoff increases in the face of 
trade liberalization. This is because the intersectoral resource allocation (IRA) effect 
dominates the Melitz effect in these sectors. Consequently, the larger country can lose from 
trade liberalization. Some hypotheses related to firms’ exporting behavior across sectors upon 
opening up to trade and upon trade liberalization are also derived. Analyses of firm-level data 
of Chinese manufacturing sectors confirm these hypotheses. 
JEL-Code: F120, F140. 
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642210). 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
How do ﬁrms’ entry, exit and output decisions respond to trade integration and trade liberalization?
Do they respond diﬀerently across sectors? How is trade pattern determined by the interaction between
comparative advantage across sectors and monopolistic competition between ﬁrms within the same
sector? How is trade pattern aﬀected by globalization? We try to answer these questions by developing
a model of trade with comparative advantage across sectors and intra-sectoral ﬁrm heterogeneity.
There are by and large two types of international trade: inter-industry trade and intra-industry
trade. It is widely recognized that the former is driven by comparative advantage and the latter by
economies of scale. The most widely used models for capturing comparative advantage are of the
Ricardian type (e.g. Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson (DFS) 1977, Eaton and Kortum 2002) and
the Heckscher-Ohlin type. The most notable models used to capture intra-industry trade are probably
attributed to Krugman (1979, 1980). More recently, Melitz (2003) extends Krugman’s (1980) model
to analyze intra-industry trade when there is ﬁrm heterogeneity, thus capturing the selection of ﬁrms
according to productivity and proﬁt-shifting to ﬁrms of higher productivity when a country opens up
to trade and trade liberalization. It stimulates much further work in this direction, notably Chaney
(2008), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and Arkolakis (2010), to name just a few papers.
Most papers analyzing trading economies focus their analysis on the eﬀects attributed to one single
trade model. For example, they assume that the world is described by an Armington, Krugman, DFS,
Eaton and Kortum, or Melitz model. Thus, they ignore the interaction of the various eﬀects when
both comparative advantage and economies of scale are present and there are both inter-industry and
intra-industry trade between countries. This paper proposes a uniﬁed framework to capture both inter-
industry and intra-industry trade in a single model. By doing so, we have a model that explains
how comparative advantage, economies of scale, ﬁrm selection and home market eﬀect interact to sort
sectors into ones in which only one of the countries produces (where there is inter-industry trade)
and ones in which both countries produce (where there is intra-industry trade). In particular, we
modify Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson’s (1977) two-country, multi-sector Ricardian framework by
incorporating intra-sectoral ﬁrm heterogeneity a la Melitz (2003). A number of testable hypotheses are
generated. For example, sectors in which one of the countries has strong comparative advantage would
be characterized by inter-industry trade, while sectors in which neither country has strong comparative
advantage would be characterized by intra-industry trade. For any given country, the fraction of ﬁrms
that export is higher for a sector with stronger comparative advantage.
Furthermore, we are able to understand the interaction of the forces attributed to comparative
advantage eﬀect, productivity selection eﬀect, home market eﬀect and variety eﬀect, in the face of trade
integration and trade liberalization. We ﬁnd that we can always decompose the total eﬀect into those
caused by inter-sectoral resource allocation (IRA) eﬀect, ﬁrm selection eﬀect according to productivity
(which we call Melitz eﬀect), and home market eﬀect (attributed to Krugman 1980).
Although trade integration (switching from autarky to trade) is always welfare-improving, the welfare
eﬀect of trade liberalization (reduction of trade barriers) depends on the relative size of the two countries,
1the height of trade barriers and the Ricardian technological diﬀerences between the two countries. In
particular, in the case of trade liberalization, we ﬁnd that the interaction of the IRA eﬀect, the Melitz
eﬀect and home market eﬀect can give rise to an eﬀect that is opposite to what is predicted by Melitz
in certain sectors. For lack of a better term, we call this eﬀect counter-Melitz eﬀect. Melitz predicts
that trade liberalization leads to an increase in the operating productivity cutoﬀ but a decrease in the
exporting productivity cutoﬀ, and this gives rise to an increase in the average productivity of the ﬁrms
that serve the domestic market, leading to domestic welfare gains. The counter-Melitz eﬀe c tt h a to c c u r s
in our model predicts that, in some sectors, trade liberalization leads to a decrease in the operating
productivity cutoﬀ but an increase in the exporting productivity cutoﬀ, and this gives rise to a decrease
in the average productivity of the ﬁrms that serve the domestic market, leading to domestic welfare
losses in these sectors. This is because the IRA eﬀect dominates the Melitz eﬀect in the sectors where
the larger country has the strongest comparative disadvantage and yet still produces. The existence of
such sectors in the larger country is attributed to the home market eﬀect. For this reason, they cannot
exist in the smaller country. In other words, in these sectors, the home market eﬀect interacts with
the IRA eﬀect to create a force so large that it overwhelms the Melitz eﬀect, leading to loss from trade
liberalization.
Among the recent literature modelling open economy with heterogeneous ﬁrms, our closest neighbors
are Demidova (2008) and Okubo (2009). Demidova (2008) extends Melitz’s (2003) model to a setting
with two countries of the same size but are asymmetric in the distribution of the productivity draws of
ﬁrms. She assumes that there is only one diﬀerentiated-good sector, in which both countries produce
and trade with each other in equilibrium. In contrast, we assume that the two countries are of diﬀerent
sizes, there is a continuum of sectors, and in equilibrium there are sectors in which only one country
produces (with one-way trade) as well as ones in which both countries do (with two-way trade). She
assumes a general distribution function for ﬁrm productivity whereas we assume the distribution to be
Pareto. In both her model and ours, there exists a homogeneous good sector in which both countries
produce and trade cost is zero in that sector. Like her, we ﬁnd that the laggard country may lose from
falling trade cost. However, we show that this can only happen in the large country. Okubo (2009)
also introduces multiple sectors into the Melitz model, thus making it a hybrid of the multiple-sector
Ricardian model and the Melitz model. In the two-sector case he analyzes the general equilibrium
eﬀects, allowing the endogenous determination of the relative wage. But the focus of his paper is quite
diﬀerent from ours, though there are some similarities. He mainly focuses on changes in population and
the eﬀects on the number of varieties. We mainly focus on how the strength of comparative advantage
of a sector aﬀects ﬁrm selection in diﬀerent sectors under trade integration and trade liberalization. We
analyze and obtain closed form solution of the international pattern of specialization and trade as a
function of trade barriers, relative country size and Ricardian comparative advantage. We decompose
the total eﬀect of trade liberalization into the IRA eﬀect and Melitz eﬀect and explain the condition
under which one eﬀect can dominate the other. Most importantly, we identify the conditions under
which there is a counter-Melitz eﬀect and a loss from trade liberalization.
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) incorporate ﬁrm heterogeneity into a two-sector, two-country
Heckscher-Ohlin model, and analyze how falling trade costs lead to the reallocation of resources, both
2within and across industries. Inter-sectoral resource reallocation changes the ex-ante comparative ad-
vantage and provides a new source of welfare gains from trade and redistribution of income across
factors. In contrast to the work of BRS (2007), our paper focusses on how comparative advantage
and increasing returns to scale determine inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral resource allocation as well as
welfare in the face of trade liberalization and other changes.
Hsieh and Ossa (2010) build a Ricardo-Krugman-Melitz model with many countries and many
sectors, each of which consists of heterogeneous ﬁrms engaging in monopolistic competition with each
other. They then analyze how real incomes of all countries are aﬀected by productivity growth in one
of the countries. The diﬀerence with our paper is that they only focus on the case when all countries
produce in all sectors. In contrast, we analyze a two-country setting, but we allow for the possibility
that countries endogenously specialize in certain sectors and so do not produce in sectors where they
have strong comparative disadvantage, and this gives rise to interesting possibilities. We are able to
obtain closed form solution to comparative statics with regard to how productivity cutoﬀ for survival,
exporting productivity cutoﬀ, ﬁrm number and welfare are impacted by trade liberalization and other
changes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model with heterogeneous ﬁrms in the
closed economy and examines the properties of the equilibrium. In section 3, we carry out an analysis
of the equilibrium in the open economy. We analyze the pattern of specialization and trade and identify
the existence of inter-industry trade as well as intra-industry trade. In section 4, we show the impact of
trade integration on the productivity cutoﬀs, the number of ﬁrms and welfare. An empirical test of the
main proposition of the section is carried out. In section 5, we analyze the eﬀects of trade liberalization,
and demonstrate the existence of a counter-Melitz eﬀect in certain comparative disadvantage sectors
of the large country. Empirical tests of the main propositions of the section are carried out. The last
section concludes.
2A C l o s e d - e c o n o m y M o d e l
In this sector, we shall describe the features of a closed economy, but where necessary we also touch
upon some features of a two-country model when the closed economy opens up to trade. The closed
economy is composed of multiple sectors: a homogenous-good sector, and a continuum of sectors of
diﬀerentiated goods. There is only one factor input called labor. The homogeneous good is produced
using a constant returns to scale technology. It is freely traded with zero trade costs when the country is
opened up to trade. We assume that in order to produce a diﬀerentiated good, a ﬁrm has to pay a sunk
cost of entry. After entry, a ﬁrm decides whether or not to produce according to whether the expected
present discounted value of its economic proﬁt is non-negative after its ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity has
realized. The economic proﬁt is determined by the following factors. There is a ﬁxed cost of production
per period, and a constant variable cost of production. The ﬁxed cost of production is constant for
all ﬁrms but the variable cost of production of a ﬁrm is partly determined by a random draw from a
3distribution. Upon payment of the entry cost ,t h eﬁrm earns the opportunity to make a random draw
from a distribution of ﬁrm productivity. The draw will determine the ﬁrm-speciﬁc component of the
ﬁrm’s productivity (i.e. reciprocal of the unit labor requirement for production). The above features of
the model are basically drawn from Melitz (2003). Unlike Melitz, there is another factor that aﬀects the
variable cost of production of a ﬁrm, which is an exogenously determined sector-speciﬁc technological
level. In general, this technological level diﬀers across sectors in a country as well as diﬀers across
countries within the same sector. The set of sector-speciﬁc technological levels across sectors in both
countries determine the pattern of comparative advantage across sectors of each country. The above
features are basically drawn from DFS (1977). Our model is therefore a hybrid of Melitz (2003) and
DFS (1977).
There are  consumers, each supplying one unit of labor. Preferences are deﬁned by a nested
Cobb-Douglas function:
ln = ln +
R 1







0  =1−  (2)
where  denotes the share of expenditure on homogenous goods,  is the share of expenditure on
diﬀerentiated good  ∈ [01];  is the endogenously determined mass of varieties in diﬀerentiated
sector . The homogeneous good is produced with constant unit labor requirement 1. The price
of the homogeneous good is ,w h e r e is the wage, as it is produced and sold under perfect
competition. For the diﬀerentiated-goods sectors, the exact price index for each sector is denoted by









where () represents the price of variety  in sector ,a n d represents the elasticity of substitution








where  =  denotes the total expenditure on all goods.
We shall assume that the labor productivity of a ﬁrm  ∈ [∞] in sector  follows a Pareto
Distribution (),w h e r e is the exogenously determined minimum productivity in diﬀerentiated
sector  (the sector-speciﬁc component of productivity of the ﬁrm in sector ), and  (− 1) is the
shape parameter of the distribution.1 More precisely, the labor productivity of a ﬁrm is determined






where  ∈ [1∞]; the other is ,w h i c hi ss e c t o r - s p e c i ﬁc. Labor used in ﬁrm  in sector  is
1The assumption − 1 ensures that, in equilibrium, the size distribution of ﬁrms has a ﬁnite mean.





where  is the ﬁxed cost of production per period, () is the productivity of ﬁrm  in sector ,.
















If a ﬁrm draws too low a productivity, it will exit immediately, as the expected present discounted value
of its economic proﬁt is negative. To be more precise, denote the cutoﬀ productivity of a surviving ﬁrm
by . We shall call this the productivity cutoﬀ for survival or the operating productivity cutoﬀ. Then,
















where () ≡ 
, () is the c.d.f. of the distribution of productivity in the sector and () is its
















 −  +1
¶ 1
−1
 .( 5 )






From now on, we shall assume for tractability that () is a Pareto distribution as described above.
The qualitative nature of most of our results will not be aﬀected by this assumption. There is no
discounting of future, and only stationary equilibrium is considered. After making a draw from the
productivity distribution, a ﬁrm may decide to exit immediately if it expects to make zero present-
discounted proﬁts in the future. The zero cutoﬀ proﬁt (ZCP) condition determines the productivity 
















We assume that in each period, an operating ﬁrm faces a constant probability  of a bad shock that
forces it to exit, and will earn a positive proﬁt in every period until hit by the shock.
5As more ﬁrms enter, the cutoﬀ productivity increases. This in turn lowers the probability of surviving
after entry. So, when the cutoﬀ productivity becomes suﬃciently high, there will be no more entry.
More precisely, the free entry (FE) condition, which relates the cutoﬀ productivity to the entry cost ,
is given by




where  ≡ 1−() is the ex-ante probability of successful entry; e  = 1
e  i st h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo ft h e
average proﬁt ﬂow of a surviving ﬁrm; and e  = (e ) is the average proﬁt ﬂow of a surviving ﬁrm,












according to the ZCP condition (6) and equation
(5).2
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Lemma 1 In the closed economy, the fraction of ﬁrms that can successfully enter is the same across
sectors. The number of ﬁrms in each sector is proportional to the sector’s share in total expenditure.
In fact the result stated in Lemma 1 is independent of the assumption of Pareto distribution. The
only unknown in equation (7) is , as aggregate productivity e  is a function of  for any distribution,
thus  is endogenously determined and unrelated to .3 Similar logic applies to the result concerning
, for it is endogenously determined by  following equation (6). And the actual cutoﬀ productivity
is ,w h i c hs t i l ld i ﬀers across sectors. From now on, we assume −1
−+1 ·

 ≥ 1,i no r d e rt oa v o i d
the corner solution.4
The intuition of this proposition is that, an increase in the sector-speciﬁc technology will cause a
ﬁrm’s optimal price to decrease, and following this, the aggregate price for this sector will decrease as
well. This price reduction leads to two opposite eﬀects on the proﬁto faﬁrm: on the one hand, the
decline of sectoral aggregate price causes more demand for each ﬁrm, which increases the ﬁrm’s proﬁt;
on the other hand, the decrease of price will reduce the proﬁt. These two eﬀects cancel each other so that
the expected proﬁto fe a c hﬁrm does not change. As a result, the fraction of ﬁrms that can successfully
enter will be the same across sectors, and the number of ﬁrms in each sector is proportional to the
sector’s share in total expenditure. It is also noteworthy that although the increase in sector-speciﬁc
technology does not aﬀect the number of ﬁrms, it will improve consumers’ welfare due to the increased
output of each ﬁrm.





















. The third equality arises







(). The fourth equality comes from the fact that  = (),w h i c hi st h eZ C P
condition above. The ﬁfth equality comes from (5).







  1,  will have corner solution. Even so, Lemma 1 still holds in this case.
63 An Open-economy Model
In this section, we consider a global economy with two countries: Home and Foreign. We attach an
asterisk to all the variables pertaining to Foreign. We index sectors such that as the index increases
Home’s comparative advantage strengthens. In other words, the sector-speciﬁcr e l a t i v ep r o d u c t i v i t y
() ≡  ≡ 
∗

increases in  ∈ [01]. Therefore, 0()  0.
On the demand side, we assume that consumers in both countries have identical tastes:
ln = ln +
R 1
0  ln with
R 1










On the production side, the labor productivity in the homogeneous good sector are respectively 
and ∗
 in Home and Foreign. In the rest of the paper, we assume that the homogeneous good sector
is suﬃciently large so that the homogeneous good is produced in both countries. We also assume that
there is no trade cost associated with the homogeneous good. Therefore free trade of homogeneous goods









by setting ∗ =1 . Therefore, in equilibrium  = ∗ =1 . The speciﬁcation on technology in the
diﬀerentiated-good sectors is the same as in autarky.
The subscript “”p e r t a i n st od o m e s t i cﬁrm serving domestic market in sector , the subscript
“” pertains to domestic ﬁrm serving foreign market in sector , and the subscript “”p e r t a i n st o
sector  without regard to which market is being served. A superscript “∗” denotes variables pertaining
to Foreign. For the diﬀerentiated-good sectors, each ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing price in the domestic
market is given, as before, by ()= 1
().B u tH o m e ’ se x p o r t i n gﬁrms will set higher prices in
the Foreign market due to the existence of an iceberg trade cost, such that  ( 1) units of goods have
to be shipped from the source in order for one unit to arrive at the destination. Therefore, the optimal
export price of a Home-produced good sold in Foreign is given by ()= 
(). Similarly, Foreign’s








(). Here, we assume identical
iceberg trade cost  for both countries for simplicity.
3.1 Firm entry and exit
A c c o r d i n gt ot h eﬁrms’ pricing rules, the gross revenue ﬂow and net proﬁt ﬂow of ﬁrm  in diﬀerentiated











7The expressions for the corresponding variables for Foreign’s ﬁrms, ∗
() and ∗
(),a r ed e ﬁned anal-
ogously. The variables  and ∗
 are the aggregate price index in sector  of goods sold in Home and
Foreign, respectively. Their expressions are given in equation (8) below. Following the same logic, the












The expressions for the corresponding variables for Foreign’s ﬁrms, ∗
() and ∗
(),a r ed e ﬁned
analogously. The variable  is the ﬁxed cost of exporting to be paid at each date, which is the same for
all ﬁrms. Note that we can interpret  =  as the amortized cost of entry into the export market,
where  is the one-time ﬁx e dc o s to fe n t r yi n t ot h ee x p o r tm a r k e t .L e t and  denote the cutoﬀs
of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity for domestic sales and exporting respectively of sector  for Home ﬁrms
; ∗
 and ∗
 denote the corresponding variables for Foreign. Consequently, the mass of exporting ﬁrms










where  denotes the mass of operating ﬁrms in Home. The corresponding expression relating the
variables ∗
 and ∗
 for Foreign are deﬁned analogously. Then, in diﬀerentiated sector ,t h em a s so f
varieties available to consumers in Home is equal to
 =  + ∗

and ∗
 is deﬁned analogously. The aggregate price indexes are given by:
 =( )
1







where e  and e ∗
 denote the aggregate productivity in diﬀerentiated sector  for goods sold in Home































where e  ( e ∗
 )a n de  ( e ∗
 ) denote respectively the aggregate productivity level of all of Home’s
(Foreign’s) operating ﬁrms and Home’s (Foreign’s) exporting ﬁrms.5 The relationships between e  and
, between e ∗
 and ∗
, between e  and , and between e ∗
 and ∗
, are exactly the same as in













for  = . From the above equations, it is obvious that these aggregate productivity measures as well
5The derivation of the above two equations are available from the corresponding author’s homepage at
http://ihome.ust.hk/~elai/ or upon request.
8as aggregate price indexes are functions of (, ∗
, , ∗
, , ∗
). As will be shown below, as
long as

 is suﬃciently large, an entering ﬁrm will produce only if it can generate positive present-
discounted proﬁt by selling domestically, and export only if it can generate positive present-discounted
proﬁt by selling abroad.6 Then we have the following four zero cutoﬀ proﬁt conditions
()=()



























Deﬁne e  and e ∗
 as the average proﬁt ﬂow of a surviving ﬁrm in sector  in Home and Foreign
respectively. It can be easily shown that7








































These are analogous to the equation shown in footnote 2 for the closed economy. The potential entrant
will enter if her expected post-entry present-discounted proﬁt is above the cost of entry. Hence, the
Free Entry (FE) conditions for Home and Foreign are, respectively






 −  +1
¶
 · ()






















Assuming that both countries produce in sector , given the wage ratio ∗











 }. If this condition is not satisﬁed, then there may exist some ﬁrms that only
export. Those ﬁrms need to pay a ﬁxed cost of  +  in order to export.


















−+1. The third equality arises







(). The fourth equality comes from the fact that  = (),w h i c hi st h eZ C P





can be derived from similar
s t e p sa sa b o v eb yr e p l a c i n gt h es u b s c r i p t“ ”b y“ ”a n dt h ev a r i a b l e by . Finally, 1 − ()=
−.
9(11) to (16) since the aggregate prices are functions of these six variables (for details, please refer to the























































−1.T h e v a r i a b l e  and  can be interpreted as summary
measures of trade barriers;  can be interpreted as competitiveness of Home in diﬀerentiated goods
sector . Recall that 0
()  0 is assumed.
The condition −1 is needed to ensure that in both countries there exist some sectors in
which some ﬁrms produce exclusively for their domestic market. This is exactly the required condition
in Melitz (2003) for the same purpose. The rationale of this assumption is explained in the Appendix.8
In this paper, a stricter condition

  max{ 
∗ ∗
 } is adopted so as to ensure that some ﬁrms produce
exclusively for their domestic market in all sectors.
A c c o r d i n gt oe q u a t i o n(21) and (22) Home ﬁrms will exit sector  when  ≤ 0, and Foreign’s ﬁrms
will exit the sector if ∗




()−1 is needed for both
countries to produce positive outputs in this sector, or else there will be complete dominance by one
country in the sector and one-way trade. Rearranging these inequalities, we can sort the sectors into






















  1.] And 1 is also supported by empirical evidence. The ﬁrm’s revenue in sector , (),f o l l o w s
a Pareto distribution with parameter

−1. According to Axtell (2001),

−1 i sc l o s et oo n e ,w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a t
−+1
−1 is close to 0. To be more precise, it equals 0059 according to Axtell’s estimation; therefore  approaches 
,w h i c h
must be larger than 1.[ F o r =5(which must be larger than  −1), and a small  =1 1, we need

  3220 in order for
Bt ob el e s st h a n1 . ]














for any possible GDP ratio 
∗,w h i c h
ensures that the productivity cutoﬀs will never reach the corner for the sectors in which both countries
produce.
For the sectors where one country completely dominates, there is no interior solution to some of
the equations in the system above, as no ﬁrm in the other country has incentive to enter the market,
which means that the number of ﬁrms in that country is a corner solution. Therefore, a diﬀerent set of
equations need to be solved for this case. Without loss of generality, we consider the Home-dominated
sectors. As there is no competition from Foreign’s ﬁrms when Home’s ﬁrms export their goods, the










Accordingly, the two zero cutoﬀ conditions for Home (11) and (13) continue to hold.
As the Free entry condition (15) for Home ﬁrms continues to hold, solving the diminished system of






























 1 by noting that  =
1−()
1−().A n
analogous set of solutions for the Foreign-dominated sectors can be obtained.10 11
Proposition 1 In sectors  ∈ [21], where Home has the strongest comparative advantage, only Home
produces, and there is one-way trade. An analogous situation applies to Foreign in sectors  ∈ [0 1].
In sectors  ∈ (1 2), where neither country has strong comparative advantage, both countries produce,







































11The uniqueness of the above equilibrium is proved in an appendix posted on the corresponding author’s homepage at
http://ihome.ust.hk/~elai/ or upon request.
11We show the three zones of international division of labor in Figure 1 below:12
Figure 1. Three Zones of International Specialization (assumption: expenditure shares
are equal across sectors).
Pattern of international specialization
In general, the pattern of international specialization depends on the size of the trade barrier, the
pattern of comparative advantage of the two countries (i.e. the form of the a(k) function) and the sizes
of the two countries.
It is clear that when the trade barrier is very large (but not inﬁnity) both countries produce in all
sectors regardless of the form of the a(k) function and the sizes of the two countries: For any given a(k)
function, one can always ﬁnd a suﬃciently large  that the solutions from the above equations for 1
and 2 yield 1  0 and 2  1. There is intra-industry trade of all diﬀerentiated goods in this case.
Given that () is symmetrical (e.g. ()=1for all  ∈ [01],o r(05+)=1 (05−) for all  ∈ [0
05]), the larger country will be a net exporter of the diﬀerentiated goods. This is because of the home
market eﬀect attributed to Krugman (1980). At the other extreme, under free trade, Home specializes
in the diﬀerentiated goods in which it has comparative advantage (i.e. goods for which ()  1)
while Foreign specializes in diﬀerentiated goods in which it has comparative advantage (i.e. goods for
which ()  1), provided that (0)  1 and (1)  1. In this case, whether or not Home exports the
homogeneous good depends on the () function and the relative size of the two countries. Given that
() is symmetrical, the larger country will be a net importer of the diﬀerentiated goods.13 On the
other hand, if (1)  1 (i.e. ()  1 for all  ∈ [01]), then Home has comparative disadvantage in
12The dashed curves represent the equilibrium ﬁrm numbers of the original system of equations based on the assumption
that both countries produce positive outputs in all sectors.
13For example, given that (05+)=(05 − ),i f
∗ then the value of Home’s exports of diﬀerentiated goods
12all diﬀerentiated goods (compared to the homogeneous good). In this case, under free trade, Foreign
completely dominates all diﬀerentiated-good sectors, while Home specializes in and exports only the
homogeneous good. In any case, there is no intra-industry trade when trade barrier falls to zero.
Lemma 2 When trade barrier is suﬃciently large (but not inﬁnity), all trades in the diﬀerentiated
goods are intra-industry in nature . If a(k) is symmetrical, the larger country will be a net exporter
of the diﬀerentiated goods. When trade barrier is zero, all trades in the diﬀerentiated goods are inter-
industry in nature. If a(k) is symmetrical, the larger country will be a net importer of the diﬀerentiated
goods.
4 Opening up to Trade
In this section, we analyze how opening trade between the two countries impacts the economy of
each country, e.g. the productivity cutoﬀs, the mass of producing and exporting ﬁrms, as well as
welfare. Before proceeding with the analysis, it is helpful to list the solutions to the relevant variables
corresponding to the three types of sectors in the following table:
Sector type Foreign-dominated Two-way trade Home-dominated















































































   (2)
1
1− 1































Table 1: Solution of the System
1 =
 − 1


























exceeds the value of its exports of diﬀerentiated goods under free trade, and so Home is a net importer of the diﬀerentiated
goods and net exporter of the homogeneous good under free trade.
134.1 Impacts on productivity cutoﬀs
In this subsection, we analyze how trade aﬀects the productivity cutoﬀs from two aspects: within sector
and across sectors. First, we look at how trade integration changes the cutoﬀs within a certain sector.
As a result, we ﬁnd that the impacts of trade integration on productivity cutoﬀsa r et h es a m ea s
in Melitz (2003) in all sectors. Then we compare the cutoﬀs across sectors upon trade integration.
We add a subscript  to all the parameters pertaining to autarky (c=closed economy). It has been










 = 1. If both countries produce, then the equilibrium cutoﬀsf o r





,w eh a v e   and ∗
  ∗
.











∗ 1  (∗
)
 if only Foreign produces
Hence, the least productive ﬁrms in all sectors will exit the market after trade integration. As a result,
resources will be reallocated to the most productive ﬁrms. Furthermore,   ,i m p l i e st h a t
e   e ,a n d∗
  ∗
 implies that e ∗
  e ∗
. Therefore, the average productivity in any sector 
is higher under trade integration than in autarky. Thus we generalize Melitz’s result to a setting where
there exist endogenous intra-industry trade and inter-industry trade in a single model.
In the closed economy, the operating cutoﬀs are identical across sectors. However, this is not true
any more in the open economy. In the sectors where both countries produce, the equilibrium operating
cutoﬀ is an increasing function of the sectoral comparative advantage. More precisely, as  increases,
 rises but ∗
 falls, and, following the free entry conditions (15) and (16),  falls but ∗
 rises.
Thus, we have
Proposition 2 In sectors where both countries produce, for a given country, a sector with stronger
comparative advantage has a higher fraction of domestic ﬁrms that export and higher fraction of revenue
derived from exporting.
Moreover, ∗
      ∗
 iﬀ Home is more competitive in sector  (  1), while
  ∗
  ∗
   iﬀ   1. This result and Proposition 2 are summarized by Figure 2 below.
14Figure 2. How productivity cutoﬀs vary across sectors in
which both countries produce (Home’s comparative
advantage increases with )
4.2 Empirical Tests of Proposition 2
Our model predicts that a sector with stronger comparative advantage will have a higher fraction
of ﬁrms that export. Furthermore, the share of revenue derived from exporting increases with the
comparative advantage of a sector. The National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) obtains annual
reports from all state enterprises and large- and medium-sized non-state enterprises (with sales above
5 million RMB) in the manufacturing sector, and sort all ﬁrms into 4-digit-level industries according to
the Chinese Industry Classiﬁcation (CIC) system. We obtain this dataset and calculate the fraction of
ﬁrms that export and share of revenue derived from exporting in each 2-digit CIC industry. In order
to test Proposition 2, we need to establish a proper measure of China’s comparative advantage in each
industry. A common measure of comparative advantage without regard to factor-intensity is “revealed





where the subscript  refers to China,  denotes exports from China in industry ,  denotes
total exports from China. The subscript  refers to the world. Therefore  and  are the
corresponding variables for the world. As each CIC 2-digit industry usually contains one or several
SITC 2-digit industries, we match each 2-digit industry based on CIC with a group of 2-digit industries
15b a s e do nS I T C . 14 We calculate the revealed comparative advantage of each of the CIC 2-digit sectors in
China in the year 2000, based on the trade ﬂow data calculated by Robert Feenstra. The relationship
between revealed comparative advantage and export propensity (i.e. fraction of ﬁrms that export) as
well as revenue share from exporting are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3.
Proposition 2 is by and large conﬁrmed by the data, as shown Figure 3. It is clear that the points
can be ﬁtted with an upward sloping curve in each diagram, meaning that both export propensity and
revenue share from exporting increase with the strength of revealed comparative advantage of a sector.
For robustness check, we also tried the labor to non-labor cost ratio and labor to capital ratio as proxies
for a sector’s comparative advantage, and get positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationships in the
regressions.
4.3 Impacts on the masses of ﬁrms
In this subsection, we mainly focus on how trade will aﬀect the mass of ﬁr m si ne a c hs e c t o r .A si nt h e
previous subsection, a subscript  denotes all the variables referring to the closed economy.


















⎦  2∗ = ∗
.
14Usually, a CIC 2-digit industry contains one or several SITC 2-digit industries. We merge several SITC 2-digit sectors
together to form a group of sectors, which exactly matches one CIC 2-digit sector (for some sectors, we merge two CIC
sectors together to get a more accurate match). Each CIC 2-digit sector represents one sector  in the formula above. The
matching at the 4-digit level becomes very tedious. So we did not go further to test the theory at the 4-digit level.
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 −  +1
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= 2∗ = ∗
 if only Foreign produces
We summarize the above ﬁndings in the following proposition:
Lemma 3 In sectors where only Home produces under trade, the number of domestic ﬁrms in Home
is the same as in autarky. In sectors where both countries produce under trade, the number of domestic
ﬁrms in each sector decreases in Home after opening up to trade.
Obviously, this proposition applies equally to Foreign.














()−1 decreases with . Therefore, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4 For any given country, in sectors where both countries produce under trade, the domestic
ﬁrm number to expenditure ratio increases with the strength of comparative advantage of the sector.
4.4 Impacts on welfare














,w ec a nw r i t e
Home’s aggregate price index in the sector as:












Substituting the equilibrium values of , ∗
, ∗
























































































Therefore, the welfare increases after trade integration. The following proposition and Figure 4 sum-
marize the analysis above.
Proposition 3 Welfare increase in both countries after they open up to trade with each other.
Figure 4. Welfare Impact of Trade Integration ( = ∗ =1by assumption and
normalization).
In the next section, we perform comparative statics concerning the eﬀects of trade liberalization.
Unlike Dornbusch et al (1977), the relative wage is directly determined by the relative productivity in
the homogeneous-good sector in our model.15
15We have also tried the version without the homogeneous sector, and relative wage is determined by balance of trade,
as in Dornbusch et al. (1977). In that case, the eﬀect on welfare is highly ambiguous, but still the results are very diﬀerent
from Dornbusch et al. (1977), unless we made the fully symmetric assumption like Okubo (2009).
185 Trade liberalization







As (23) shows, welfare in each country in the sectors where both countries produce just depends on
the production cutoﬀ  and ∗
 respectively, as they directly determine aggregate price index  and
∗


























which shows that  increases with  (and so does ∗
, according to equation (20)) if and only if
()
  2
1+2.M o r e o v e r ,∗
 increases with  (and so does , according to equation (19)) if and only
if ()
  1+2
2 .16 Comparing (1)
and (2)
 with these two thresholds, we will see that the pattern
of specialization (which is determined by the values of 1 and 2)a l s od e p e n d so nt h er e l a t i v es i z eo f
the two countries.
To evaluate the welfare impacts of trade liberalization, refer to equations (23) to (25) and to Appen-
dix C. Figure 5 shows the signs of the welfare eﬀect of trade liberalization in diﬀerent sectors of Home
and Foreign, corresponding to diﬀerent values of ∗. The upper sign inside a rectangle indicates the
sign of Home’s welfare change due to an inﬁnitesimal decrease in , and the lower sign indicates the sign
of Foreign’s welfare change. The diagram is deﬁn e db yt h ec u r v e s1 and 2 as a function of ∗,a s




2 .A s decreases, 1 increases,
2 ﬁrst decreases then increases, ()
 = 2
2+1 increases while ()
 = 2+1
2 decreases. Depending on
the range of [0, 1] and the value of ∗, it is possible that only a subset of the zones shown in Figure
5 is included in  ∈ [01] for any given value of ∗.
Figure 5 can be summarized by the following lemma and proposition:




2 for all , trade liberalization weakly improves the welfare in both countries.
Proposition 4 Suppose Home is larger than Foreign. In the sectors where Home has the strongest
comparative disadvantage but still produces, there is a counter-Melitz eﬀect in the sense that  de-
creases while  increases in the face of trade liberalization, leading to welfare losses in these sectors.
16An increase in  as a result of an increase in  or an increase in  w o u l db o t hl e a dt oa ni n c r e a s ei n. Therefore,
according to equation (20), an increase in  as a result of an increase in  or  l e a d st oi n c r e a s e si n
∗
 and .
Similarly, according to (19), an increase in  as a result of an increase in  or  leads to increases in  and 
∗
,
following the same logic.
19Foreign, the smaller country, will never lose from trade liberalization as it will never experience any
counter-Melitz eﬀect.
The last proposition deserves more discussion, asi th i g h l i g h t so n eo ft h em o s ti m p o r t a n tr e s u l t s










.T h eﬁrst condition indicates that the sector is a
two-way trade sector. The second condition indicates that Home’s welfare decreases with a reduction
in  provided that the ﬁrst condition holds. In other words, these are sectors where the larger country
has strong comparative disadvantage yet still produces. In fact, there is a counter-Melitz eﬀect in
such circumstance, i.e.  decreases while  increases in the face of trade liberalization, leading to a
decrease in the average productivity of ﬁrms serving the Home market, thus lowering welfare. We can
explain this phenomenon by decomposing the total eﬀect of trade liberalization into two eﬀects below.
We shall analyze from the perspective of Home and Home’s ﬁrms.
1. The inter-sectoral resource allocation (IRA) eﬀect as  decreases – trade liberalization leads
to resources in Home (as well in Foreign) being re-allocated away from the diﬀerentiated-good sectors
in which it has comparative disadvantage to the sectors in which it has comparative advantage (these
include other diﬀerentiated-good sectors and the homogeneous good sector). Note that the IRA eﬀect
does not take place in the one-way trade diﬀerentiated-good sectors. The IRA eﬀect tends to reduce
the welfare of the comparative disadvantage diﬀerentiated-good sectors and raise the welfare of the
comparative advantage diﬀerentiated-good sectors. Deﬁne  and  as the masses of potential entrants
in the open economy and autarky respectively. Then  =  [1 − ()] and  =  [1 − ()].
Re-allocation of resource (labor) across sectors explains why, in the diﬀerentiated-good sectors in which
Home has the strongest comparative disadvantage, the mass of potential Home entrants () decreases,
while, in the same sectors, the mass of potential Foreign entrants (∗
)i n c r e a s e s . 17 Let us analyze from
the perspective of Home’s ﬁrms. As ∗
 increases, Foreign’s market becomes more competitive (as there
are more ﬁrms in Foreign) and so  () decreases for all . This creates pressure for an increase
in  (i.e. only the more productive Home ﬁrms can proﬁtably export now). As  decreases,  also
decreases. This leads to the expansion of the sizes of the surviving Home ﬁrms. Thus,  () increases
for all . This creates pressure for a decrease in  as some less productive ﬁrms which were
expected to be unproﬁtable before can be expected to be proﬁtable now. In other words, the exporting
ﬁrms in Home, which are most productive, have to shrink, and so they release resources to the less
productive ﬁrms. The least productive surviving ﬁrms in Home would expand, and the marginal ﬁrm
that were not proﬁt a b l eb e f o r en o wb e c o m e sp r o ﬁtable.18
17Note that if  and  are both constant for all ,t h e n is the same for all  , even as trade cost decreases. As 
deviates from being a constant, the IRA eﬀect kicks in. In this case, under trade liberalization,  increases (decreases)
for the sectors in which Home has comparative advantage (disadvantage).
18To see the eﬀect more starkly, consider the case when 
∗ is very large. In this case, in these sectors, Home has more
ﬁrms while Foreign has fewer ﬁrms. The market share of Foreign’s ﬁrms in these comparative disadvantage sectors cannot
be too high as Foreign’s resources (
∗) is too small compared with Home’s resources (). Therefore, a decrease in  (as
well as ) leads to an increase in the size and revenue of each Home ﬁrm that remains. Therefore  () increases for
all .
202. The Melitz eﬀect (intra-sectoral resource allocation eﬀect as  decreases). It is welfare-improving
for Home for all sectors except the Home-dominated sectors and the homogeneous-good sector. Here,
we ignore the IRA eﬀect, i.e. suppose that the masses of potential entrants  and ∗
 were to remain
ﬁxed. In other words, the expected toughness of competition for an exporting ﬁrm from both countries
is unchanged. As a result, the export revenue of a typical exporting ﬁrm will increase as trade cost falls.
This creates pressure for both  and ∗
 to decrease. Meanwhile, this will force the least
productive ﬁrms in each country to exit (as there are more ﬁrms exporting to the domestic market).
This creates pressure for both  and ∗
 to increase. The decrease in prices of imports
and the increase in average productivity of Home’s ﬁr m sr a i s e sH o m e ’ sw e l f a r e . T h i si st h eM e l i t z
eﬀect. However, in the sectors in which Home has the strongest comparative disadvantage, the IRA
eﬀect counteracts the Melitz eﬀect. This is because the Melitz eﬀect causes trade liberalization to
increase Home ﬁrms’ advantage in selling to Foreign, whereas the IRA eﬀect causes trade liberalization
to increase the disadvantage of Home ﬁrms in selling to Foreign (as  decreases and ∗
 increases).
If the IRA eﬀect dominates, we will have a counter-Melitz eﬀect. This will be the case in the sectors
where Home has very strong comparative disadvantage yet still produces. For Foreign, the IRA eﬀect
is always positive and so it reinforces the Melitz eﬀect. Therefore, there cannot be counter-Melitz eﬀect
for the small country.
When the IRA eﬀect in a sector is negative (i.e. if it is a comparative disadvantage sector) and if it
is large enough to dominate the Melitz eﬀect, the sectoral welfare falls upon trade liberalization. Figure
5 shows that this can occur only in the larger country. The fact that there exist sectors in which the
larger country (Home) has very strong comparative disadvantage yet still produces is because Home has
a large demand for the diﬀerentiated goods and so it attracts Home’s ﬁrms to produce there to serve
the large market while saving the transportation cost. This is the home market eﬀect, which can be
attributed to Krugman (1980).19 In such sectors, the IRA eﬀe c td o m i n a t e st h eM e l i t ze ﬀect, leading to
welfare loss in Home in these sectors.20
As the IRA eﬀects in the comparative advantage sectors are positive, there are welfare gains to these
sectors upon trade liberalization. Can these gains oﬀset the losses in the comparative disadvantage
sectors mentioned above? The answer is, it depends. If Home’s relative size is large, and the Foreign-
dominated sector is small, then the gains cannot oﬀset the losses. For example, when  =2 , ∗ =6 ,
 =1 05 (and therefore 1 =0 5 and 2 =0 7258), and suppose 0 =0 52 (and therefore 1  0,
which means that there does not exist any sector in which Foreign completely dominates). Then, Home
will unambiguously lose from trade liberalization, as it loses in the sectors where  ∈ [0 2], and does
not gain or lose in the sectors where  ∈ [21] and in the homogeneous good sector.
19The home market eﬀect is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the set of diﬀerentiated goods produced by Home
increases (i.e. 1 decreases) while the set of diﬀerentiated goods produced by Foreign decreases (i.e. 2 decreases) as 
∗
increases. This is shown in Figure 5 by the fact that the 1 curve and 2 curves are both upward sloping in 
∗.
20This home market eﬀect explains why there exist such sectors in the larger country only. The fact that the threshold
 that demarcates a switching of the dominance of IRA eﬀect versus the Melitz eﬀect is independent of 
∗,t o g e t h e r
with the fact that the set of goods produced by Home expands beyond this threshold  as 
∗ increases, explains why
there exist sectors in which the IRA eﬀect dominates the Melitz eﬀect in the large country.
21Figure 5. Welfare Eﬀects of Trade Liberalization (inﬁnitesimal reduction of
). In each region, the upper sign inside the rectangle indicates the welfare
change of Home and the lower sign indicates the welfare change of Foreign.
The short arrows indicate the movement of lines as  falls.
Therefore, we end this section by the following two testable propositions:
Proposition 5 Consider the sectors in which both countries produce. For any given country, in the
face of trade liberalization, the fraction of exporters increases in the comparative advantage sectors but
decreases in the sectors in which the country has the strongest comparative disadvantage, if the country
22is large compared with the rest of the world.
Proposition 6 Consider the sectors in which both countries produce. For any given country, in the
face of trade liberalization, the fraction of revenue derived from exporting increases in the compara-
tive advantage sectors but decreases in the sectors in which the country has the strongest comparative
disadvantage, if the country is large compared with the rest of the world.
5.1 Empirical Tests of Propositions 5 and 6
Propositions 5 and 6 predict the existence of a counter-Melitz eﬀect: For a large country, like China, in
the sectors where it has the strongest comparative disadvantage but still produces, the fraction of ﬁrms
that export and the share of revenue derived from exporting will both decrease upon trade liberalization.
Can we ﬁnd any evidence to support the existence of the counter-Melitz eﬀect? This section shows that
we indeed ﬁnd evidence of such an eﬀect.
We test the theory at 4-digit CIC level, using both the NBSC enterprise survey and the Chinese
customs data. To get a panel of variables, we need to ﬁrst tackle the problem caused by a major revision
to the CIC classiﬁcation in the year 2002. In order to have a consistent deﬁnition of sectors, we follow
Brandt, Van Biesebroeck & Zhang (2011) by adjusting the CIC 4-digit industry type of each ﬁrm in the
NBSC dataset, to have the same industry type code representing the same industry both before and
after year 2002.21 After adjusting the CIC code for each sector, we aggregate the variables at the 4-digit
sector level and obtain a panel of aggregate variables (e.g. mass of ﬁrms, mass of ﬁrms that export,
total revenue, total exporting revenue, etc.) from the years 2000 to 2006, and calculate the variables
we need.22
In order to test the eﬀect of trade liberalization, we also need to establish a proper measure of trade
cost . As transportation cost is hard to measure and should not vary much in a few years’ time, we
take the tariﬀ rate, which decreases a lot after China joined the WTO, as the measure of trade cost.
It is also noteworthy that the tariﬀ rates for diﬀerent sectors are diﬀerent, which is not consistent with
the assumption of our model. Fortunately, it turns out that the results and equations of the model will
not be qualitatively aﬀected by the heterogeneity of trade costs across sectors. Therefore, we take into
consideration the heterogeneity of tariﬀ rates across sectors in calculating which sectors is predicted to
exhibit the counter-Melitz eﬀect according to the theory.
We calculate the import volume-weighted tariﬀ rate of all the goods imported by the ﬁrms of a
sector, and take it as the tariﬀ rate of the sector. To avoid the aggregation bias and potential mismatch
21The detail of the matching can be ﬁnd at http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/
22The choice of the years is constrained by the availability of the customs data, which we will use and merge with the
NBSC data.
23of the CIC and HS codes, we merge the NBSC data with the detailed ﬁrm level import data for the
years 2000-2006 from the Chinese customs authority. We use only the data from the ﬁrms which can be
matched. For each sector, we take the values of all the goods imported by the ﬁrms in this sector and
calculate the aggregate import value by summing up the values of imports of all ﬁr m si nt h i ss e c t o r .T h e








,w h e r e is the 8-digit HS level
tariﬀ of an imported good  at year  (the Most-Favored-Nation tariﬀ rate is adopted, as is commonly
used in the literature),  i st h ea g g r e g a t ei m p o r tv o l u m eo fg o o d for all ﬁrms in sector  in that year,
and  is the number of imported inputs by sector  at year . Later, we shall use these tariﬀ data to
test our theory.
To account for the heterogeneity of tariﬀ rates across sectors, we modify some of our equations.
Allowing for diﬀerent tariﬀ rates in diﬀerent sectors does not qualitatively aﬀect the results listed














−1. It follows that Propositions 5 and 6 continue to hold. However, diﬀerent sectors












. The theory predicts that
the counter-Melitz eﬀect will occur in the two-way trade sectors in which the relative productivity 
is less than 2
1+2

. In section 4.2, it has been shown that the fraction of ﬁr m st h a te x p o r ti ne a c hs e c t o r
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




. As Axtell (2001) shows that

−1 is close to 1, we
have  ≈ 

 and so we use 

 to approximate for . We use the average tariﬀ rate in each 2-digit CIC
industry to proxy for ,a n dt a k e to be 7.23 Then for each sector, we calculate the ratio of the fraction
of exporting ﬁrms and −2
 , and rank the twenty-nine 2-digit CIC industries according to this ratio,
which we call RATIO. Table 2 shows the ranking of these 2-digit CIC sectors and the corresponding
sectoral information that determine the RATIO. A higher RATIO implies that China has stronger
comparative advantage in that sector. We choose the ten sectors with the lowest ratios to test for the
counter-Melitz eﬀect and the ten sectors with the highest ratios to test for the Melitz eﬀect. We run
(i) the fraction of exporting ﬁrms and (ii) the share of exporting revenue, on the tariﬀ rate for each
sector, while controlling for the year and industry (2-digit CIC level) ﬁxed eﬀects and other relevant
variables (including employment, capital-labor ratio, average wage in each 4-digit sector). Amongst
23Axtell (2001) shows that ﬁrm revenue distribution in US manufacturing ﬁrms can be approximated by a Pareto
distribution with shape parameter larger than but close to one. In the context of our model, the shape parameter of the
Pareto distribution of ﬁrm revenue is equal to ( − 1),w h e r e is the elasticity of substitution in our model. To be
consistent with Axtell, therefore, we assume that  is approximately equal to  − 1. In the literature, the estimated value
of  is usually between 5 and 10. In Eaton & Kortum (2002), the estimates for  are 36, 828 and 1286.T h ev a l u e so f
 used by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) are 5, 8 and 10. To be consistent with their ﬁndings, we take  to be the
around the median of both sets of results, which is approximately 8 and therefore  is taken to be about 7 (=  − 1). In
fact, the results do not change much if we assume  to be 5, 7, 8 or 10.
24these variables, employment stands for the size of the sector, and is used to control for the economies
of scales; K/L = capital-labor ratio is used to control for production technique; average wage is used to
control for the variable costs and worker skill. The right hand side variables we choose are similar to
those of Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006, Table 4). The results are shown in Tables 3A and 3B. (CA
stands for comparative advantage.)
Table 2 about here
Tables 3A and 3B about here
W es e et h a ta l lt h ec o e ﬃcients for the variable “Tariﬀ”a r es i g n i ﬁcant in both regressions. Most
importantly, the signs are distinctly positive for the ten comparative-disadvantage sectors and distinctly
negative for the ten comparative-advantage sectors. In other words, both the fraction of exporting ﬁrms
and the share of exporting revenue decrease (increase) with trade liberalization for the sectors in which
China has comparative disadvantage (comparative advantage). Therefore, we conclude that, consistent
with our theory, there exists counter-Melitz eﬀect in the sectors where China has the comparative
disadvantage but still produces; while the Melitz eﬀect continues to hold in the sectors in which China
has comparative advantage. The coeﬃcients of the other right hand side variables make sense too.
For example, higher K/L signiﬁes stronger comparative disadvantage, which lowers exporting ratio and
share of export revenue according to our theory. Higher wage signiﬁes higher labor quality, which
induces higher propensity to export.24
Robustness of the Result
The choice of the ten lowest ranking sectors to stand for comparative disadvantage sectors and
the ten highest ranking sectors to stand for comparative advantage sectors may sound a bit arbitrary.
Therefore, we check the robustness of the results by varying the set of sectors we choose. We run six
regressions for each set of sectors we choose: we run (i) the fraction of exporting ﬁrms and (ii) the
share of exporting revenue, on the tariﬀ rate for each sector, while controlling for the year and industry
(2-digit CIC level) ﬁxed eﬀects and other relevant variables (including employment, capital-labor ratio,
average wage in each 4-digit sector). The regressions are the same as the ones shown in Tables 3A and
3B, though the set of sectors used is diﬀerent. The result is shown in Figure 6.
24It is interesting to note that higher employment is correlated with lower export propensity in the comparative disad-
vantage sectors but higher export propensity in the comparative advantage sectors. The latter result is normal, and is
consistent with say Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006). The former result can perhaps be explained by the fact that a
higher employment in the comparative disadvantage sector in the face of trade liberalization signiﬁes some structural inef-
ﬁciencies were at play (e.g. existence of some non-tariﬀ protectionist measures). This would mean lower competitiveness
in the export markets.
25Fraction of exporting ﬁrms, year 2000-2006
Regressor ten sectors with weakest CA ten sectors with strongest CA
Tariﬀ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ -0.460∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗







Industry ﬁxed eﬀect NA Yes Yes NA Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed eﬀect NA Yes Yes NA Yes Yes
Observations 938 938 938 742 742 742
Table 3A
Share of exporting revenue in total revenue, year 2000-2006
Regressor ten sectors with weakest CA ten sectors with strongest CA
Tariﬀ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ -0.504∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗







Industry ﬁxed eﬀect NA Yes Yes NA Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed eﬀect NA Yes Yes NA Yes Yes
Observations 938 938 938 742 742 742
Table 3B
Note: ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1% level; ∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ∗Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
26Figure 6.
The horizontal axis in Figure 6 indicates what sectors are included when running the regressions.
On the left, a number x on the horizontal axis indicates that sectors from the sector ranked number 1
to the sector ranked number x are included in the regressions. On the right, a number x indicates that
sectors from the sector ranked number x to the sector ranked number 29 are included in the regression.
The vertical axis indicates the number of regressions for which the coeﬃcient for the variable “Tariﬀ”i s
statistically signiﬁcant when the corresponding set of sectors indicated on the horizontal axis is included
in the regressions. In the ﬁgure, the darkest bars represent the number of coeﬃcients with the right sign
(positive for the left group of sectors and negative for the right group of sectors) and signiﬁcant at 1%
level. The second darkest bars represent the number of coeﬃcients with the right sign and signiﬁcant
at 5% level (but not signiﬁcant at 1% level). The lightest bars represent the number of coeﬃcients with
the right sign, but not signiﬁcant at 5% level. From the ﬁgure, it is clear that the counter-Melitz eﬀect
becomes signiﬁcant when we include suﬃciently large number of sectors with the smallest RATIOs (the
ﬁgure shows that ﬁve is a suﬃciently large number of sectors), and the eﬀect remains signiﬁcant till we
include the thirteen sectors with the smallest RATIOs. Likewise, the Melitz eﬀect becomes signiﬁcant
when we include suﬃciently large number of sectors with the largest ratios (the ﬁgure shows that two
is a suﬃciently large number of sectors), and the eﬀect remains signiﬁcant till we include the eleven
sectors with the highest ratios. The coeﬃcients for the sectors at both ends of the ranking are mostly not
very signiﬁcant, probably due to the limited sample size (too few observations).25 The coeﬃcients are
mostly not very signiﬁcant when the sectors in the middle of the ranking are included. This is consistent
with our theory, as they are sectors at the margin, and neither the Melitz eﬀect nor the counter-Melitz
25Some 2-digit industries contain fewer than ten 4-digit sectors. Thus the degree of freedom of the regression may be
limited if we choose too few 2-digit industries for testing our propositions.
27eﬀect dominate. Thus, the total eﬀect is ambiguous. The following table shows the results of the OLS
regressions when the data of all sectors are pooled together.
Year 2000-2006 Fraction of exporting ﬁrms Share of exporting revenue in total revenue
Regressor All sectors All sectors
Tariﬀ -0.038 0.011 0.016 -0.097∗∗∗ -0.046 -0.046







Industry ﬁxed eﬀect NA Yes Yes NA Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed eﬀect NA Yes Yes NA Yes Yes
Observations 2758 2758 2758 2758 2758 2758
Note: ∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at the 1% level; ∗∗ Signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ∗ Signiﬁcant at the
10% level.
Most of the coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant and even the signs of the coeﬃcients are
ambiguous. This is consistent with our theory, as some sectors exhibit counter-Melitz eﬀect while others
exhibit Melitz eﬀect, and therefore the total eﬀect maybe ambiguous and statistically insigniﬁcant. This
result contrast with that obtained by Bernard, Jensen & Schott (2006). They use plant level data of
the U.S. and run a similar regression of the probability of exporting on change in trade cost. They
get negative sign (Melitz eﬀect) at 10% level of signiﬁcance for that regression. The main reason for
the diﬀerence might be that, unlike China, the U.S. does not have many sectors which it have strong
comparative disadvantage but which still produces. As a result, only a few plants in U.S. will exhibit
counter-Melitz eﬀect, and so the overall eﬀect is dominated by the Melitz eﬀect, with the coeﬃcient
becomes not very signiﬁcant statistically.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we merge the heterogenous ﬁrm model of Melitz (2003) with the Ricardian model of
Dornbusch et al (1977) to form a hybrid model to explain how the pattern of international specialization
and trade is determined by the interaction of comparative advantage, economies of scale, country sizes
and trade barriers. The model is able to capture the existence of inter-industry trade and intra-industry
trade in a single uniﬁed framework. It explains how trade openness aﬀects the pattern of international
specialization and trade. It generalizes Melitz’s ﬁrm selection eﬀect in the face of trade liberalization
to a setting where the patterns of inter-industry trade and intra-industry are endogenous.
28The model predicts that the fraction of exporting ﬁr m sa sw e l la st h es h a r eo fe x p o r tr e v e n u ei n
total revenue increases with the strength of comparative advantage of a sector for any given country.
Empirical evidence conﬁrms that this is consistent with Chinese data for the years 2000-2006.
Although opening to trade is welfare-improving in both countries, trade liberalization can lead to
a counter-Melitz eﬀect in the larger country if it is insuﬃciently competitive in the sectors in which it
has the strongest comparative disadvantage but in which it still produces. In this case, the operating
productivity cutoﬀ is lowered while the exporting cutoﬀ increases in the face of trade liberalization.
This is because the inter-sectoral resource allocation (IRA) eﬀect dominates the Melitz eﬀect in these
sectors. In these sectors, trade liberalization leads to decreases in fractions of exporting ﬁrms, contrary
to Melitz (2003). Consequently, the larger country can lose from trade liberalization when all sectors
are considered. Empirical evidence in the years 2000-2006 conﬁrms that the fraction of exporting ﬁrms
as well as the share of export revenue in total revenue both decreased in some Chinese comparative-
disadvantage sectors in the face of trade liberalization, consistent with our hypothesis.
29Appendixes
A Solving for the System
In this appendix, we will show how to solve the model for the sectors where both countries produce.
In other words, we solve for (, ∗
, , ∗
, , ∗
) from the system constituted of the four zero
cutoﬀ proﬁt conditions and two free entry conditions. Combining the two zero cutoﬀ conditions for



















Equations (26), (27), and the FE conditions (15), and (16) now form a system of four equations and
four unknowns, ,,∗
 and ∗
. Solving, we obtain (17), (18), (19) and (20).
Then recall that the aggregate price indexes are given by  = 
1
1−







Substituting these price indexes into Zero Cutoﬀ Conditions (11) and (12), and with the help of equation

























































































Equations (28), (29), (30), (31), (32) then imply (21) and (22).
 and ∗
 can be obtained by substituting (30), (21), (22) into (31) and (32) respectively.
30B The Rationale for −1 
In this appendix, we explain why we need the assumption −1 .I f1, we restrict ()
 to be
within (−1), in order to avoid corner solution. To make sure that there exist some sector  in which
only the ﬁrms with the higher productivity will export (i.e.    for some  and ∗
  ∗
 for
some ), we need ()
















for some . For this to be true, we
need −1 . For the case 1,i no r d e rt om a k e   for some  and ∗
  ∗
 for some















, which also implies that −1 following similar argument.
Hence, we assume that −1 in order to guarantee that in both countries there exist some sectors
in which some ﬁrms produce exclusively for their domestic market in both countries.
C Welfare Impact of Trade Liberalization
In this appendix, we will prove how the real wage change after trade liberalization in three cases.
Without loss of generality, we assume that  ∗.
1. Foreign-dominated sectors:  ∈ (0 1). The real wage in terms of aggregate goods of sector














































Since trade liberalization will increase 1
 as  falls, the real wage in Home will be improved. However,
the real wage in Foreign, 1
∗

, is not related to the trade barriers. That’s, trade liberalization does not
aﬀect the real wage in Foreign.








































This zone is divided into two cases:




−() decreases but −−1
−()− increases as trade barrier  falls, as ()
  2
1+2.
Therefore, the real wage in Home will decline, but the real wage in Foreign rises.


















real wages in both countries increase in this zone.






































It is clear that real wage in Home is unchanged but that in Foreign increases as  falls.
32References
[1] Anderson, J.E. and Wincoop, E.V.: Trade Costs, Journal of Economic Literature 42(3), 691-751
(2004)
[2] Arkolakis, C.: Market Penetration Costs and the New Consumers Margin in International Trade,
Journal of Political Economics 118(6), 1151-1199 (2010)
[3] Axtell, R.: Zipf Distribution of US Firm Sizes, Science 293, 1818-1820 (2001)
[4] Bernard, A.B., Jensen, J.B. and Schott, P.K.: Trade costs, ﬁrms and productivity, Journal of
Monetary Economics 53(5), 917-937 (2006)
[5] Bernard, A.B., Redding, S. and Schott, P.K.: Comparative Advantage and Heterogeneous Firms,
Review of Economic studies 74(1), 31—66 (2007)
[6] Brant, L., Biesebroeck, J.V. and Zhang, Y.: Creative Accounting or Creative Destruction? Firm-
level Productivity Growth in Chinese Manufacturing, Journal of Development Economics,f o r t h -
coming
[7] Chaney, T.: Distorted Gravity: The Intensive and Extensive Margins of International Trade,
American Economic Review 98(4), 1707-1721 (2008)
[8] Demidova, S.: (2008), Productivity Improvement and Falling Trade Costs: Boon or Bane?, Inter-
national Economic Review 49(4), 1437—1462. (2008)
[9] Dornbusch, R., Fischer, S. and Samuelson, P.: Comparative Advantage, Trade, and Payments in
Ricardian model with a Continuum of Goods, American Economic Review 67(5), 823—839 (1977)
[10] Eaton, J. and Kortum, S.: Technology, Geography and Trade, Econometrica 70(5), 1741—1779
(2002)
[11] Hsieh, CT. and Ossa, R.: A Global View of Productivity Growth in China, Working Paper, June
21, 2010.
[12] Krugman, P.R.: Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition, and International Trade, Journal
of International Economics 9(4), 469-479 (1979)
[13] Krugman, P.R.: Scale Economies, Product Diﬀerentiation, and the Pattern of Trade, American
Economic Review 70(5), 950-959 (1980)
[14] Melitz, M.: The Impact of Trade on Intraindustry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Produc-
tivity. Econometrica 71(6), 1695—1725 (2003)
[15] Melitz, M., Ottaviano, G.: Market Size, Trade and Productivity, Review of Economic studies 75(1),
295—316 (2008)
[16] Okubo, T.: Firm Heterogeneity and Ricardian Comparative Advantage within and across Sectors,
Economic Theory 38(3), 533-559 (2009)
332-digit CIC Sector Ranking RATIO Exporting Ratio  − 1 Revenue† Exporting Revenue† Number of ﬁrms Employment
23 Printing 1 0.2060457 0.0588697 0.0936095 6.09E+07 4450951 3822 574235
32 Ferrous Metal 2 0.3516171 0.1002423 0.0937799 4.79E+08 3.31E+07 3302 2670636
25 Petroleum 3 0.3768006 0.1267123 0.0809525 4.49E+08 2.09E+07 1168 695982
33 Nonferrous Metal 4 0.4486556 0.1588785 0.0769695 1.99E+08 2.00E+07 2247 964593
31 Non-metallic Minerals 5 0.6913635 0.1009378 0.147333 3.54E+08 3.27E+07 14395 4089640
22 Paper 6 0.758966 0.1125856 0.1460292 1.54E+08 1.24E+07 4672 1134069
27 Medicine 7 0.7870407 0.2029437 0.1016519 1.73E+08 1.90E+07 3533 1045293
26 Chemicals 8 1.029534 0.1933925 0.126864 5.23E+08 4.99E+07 10140 3290182
36 Equipments 9 1.051111 0.1778299 0.1353177 2.07E+08 1.62E+07 5539 2315348
28 Chemical Fiber 10 1.219773 0.1951567 0.1398552 1.18E+08 5809223 702 403147
39 Electrical machinery 11 1.289248 0.2576229 0.1218989 4.74E+08 9.62E+07 8035 2334097
20 Lumber 12 1.3318 0.2122625 0.1401683 6.68E+07 1.06E+07 2789 528755
34 Fabricated Metal 13 1.356588 0.2914661 0.116103 2.07E+08 6.49E+07 6855 1373722
35 Industrial Machinery 14 1.409249 0.2331458 0.1371335 2.97E+08 4.83E+07 9419 2873499
14 Food Manufacturing 15 1.6335 0.1621738 0.1793772 1.30E+08 1.39E+07 4637 872491
40 Electronics 16 1.848309 0.4646992 0.1036434 7.31E+08 2.94E+08 4405 1926959
29 Rubber 17 1.925129 0.2793045 0.1478481 7.80E+07 1.85E+07 1783 665709
41 Instruments 18 1.966781 0.3906829 0.122375 9.30E+07 4.50E+07 1889 613863
30 Plastic 19 2.461882 0.2735153 0.1699391 1.84E+08 4.89E+07 6230 1114401
21 Furniture 20 4.817932 0.2977303 0.22 3.56E+07 1.39E+07 1498 270413
19 Leather 21 5.635618 0.5727699 0.1774048 1.24E+08 7.62E+07 2982 1094889
24 Education & Sports Tools 22 7.101038 0.7095039 0.1788398 5.54E+07 3.81E+07 1673 610412
17 Textile 23 8.703456 0.4128741 0.2432614 4.06E+08 1.23E+08 8855 4159234
37 Transportation Equipments 24 12.67962 0.2024112 0.3438413 5.39E+08 5.67E+07 6304 2972509
18 Apparel 25 15.90877 0.6336309 0.2588841 2.11E+08 1.23E+08 6720 2084046
16 Tobacco 26 16.42482 0.1195335 0.4213959 1.45E+08 1117620 343 258900
42 Handicrafts, etc 27 16.53754 0.6617596 0.2584639 7.12E+07 4.30E+07 2853 804668
15 Drinks 28 19.00744 0.0871223 0.4691182 1.71E+08 4545501 3409 1022225
13 Food Processing 29 29.627 0.1327888 0.4714715 3.75E+08 4.09E+07 10897 1744098
† In thousand yuan
Table 2. Ranking of Chinese sectors according to RATIO (strength of comparative advantage) for the year 2000